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THE EVOLUTION OF THE US AIRLINE INDUSTRY:




AVIATION TECHNOLOGY has come a long way since the
Ztintroduction of flight at the turn of the twentieth century.
In fact, the industry is considered to be in a mature stage of its
life cycle; technology has evolved-and the industry has locked-
in-to a dominant technology standard, so that radical intra-in-
dustry-spawned product innovation and industry shakeouts are
largely unlikely.' This evolutionary process is path dependent:
the initial conditions, history, and specific evolution of technol-
ogy, markets, regulations, and many other processes co-evolved
over time in a specific manner to create enormous barriers for
critical changes.2 The general concept of path dependence and
* Ph.D., (Economics and International Business), NYU, Stern School of
Business (1987). President of Aeron Aviation resources, Inc. (aircraft leasing and
airline investments). Author of, The Evolution of the US Airline Industry,
Theory, Strategy and Policy, The Netherlands: Springer (2005). I would like to
thank Professor Lawrence J. White for helpful comments, and Bruce Roswick for
his help and encouragement. This article is in fondest memory of Bruce. The
author can be contacted at byosef@nvbb.net.
I On the concept of product life cycle, see, e.g., JAMES M. UITERBACK, MASTER-
ING THE DYNAMICS OF INNOVATION xviii (1976); Steven Klepper, Entry, Exit, Growth,
and Innovation over the Product Life Cycle, 86 Am. ECON. REv. 562, 562-64 (1996).
For a general discussion in an aviation context, see Earll M. Murman, Myles Wal-
ton & Eric Rebentisch, Challenges in the Better, Faster, Cheaper Era of Aeronautical
Design, Engineering and Manufacturing, 104 AERONAUTICALJ. 481 (2000). The dis-
tinction between radical (revolutionary, non-continuous) and incremental (grad-
ual, conservative) innovations is intuitively appealing but not always clear-cut.
Entropy statistics techniques were used to measure the evolution of aircraft tech-
nology; see, e.g., Koen Frenken & Loet Leydesdorff, Scaling Trajectories in Civil Air-
craft (1913-1997), 29 RES. POL'Y 331, 331 (2000) available at http://users.
fmg.uva.nl/lleydesdorff/aircraft/preprint.pdf.
2 On the economic concept of path dependency and lock-in, see, e.g., Paul A.
David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am. ECON. REV. 332, 335-36 (1985);
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lock-in has attracted the attention of economists and policy mak-
ers, focusing on several intriguing questions: is the emerging
dominant technology (and related markets, institutions, and in-
frastructure) socially efficient, or are we trapped in an ineffi-
cient position? Can new entry challenge the leading incumbent
firms and their dominant market positions? Is lock-in a market
failure? Should the government intervene and, if so, can it, in
fact, move technologies and markets to more desirable positions
(assuming such are known and conform to the will of the politi-
cal majority)?'
Management and business researchers, on the other hand,
have analyzed a large number of case histories showing that ma-
ture and powerful incumbents often become vulnerable and
lose their dominance to disruptive entry.4 They focused on
somewhat different questions: what are the typical strengths of a
small marginal entry, and what might make it disruptive? How
should an incumbent respond to such entry? Can managers cre-
ate and manage innovation paths (rather than let chance create
dependency)? What are the implications of all of this for fur-
ther technological innovation, competition, and market
structure?5
Life cycle theories point out that during its maturity stage, an
industry's concentration tends to increase, innovation efforts
tend to focus on production processes and cost reduction, com-
petition centers on price, and incumbents become vulnerable to
the threat of disruptive entry.6 This general notion conflicts
with the traditional antitrust view that associates increased con-
W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical
Events, 99 ECON.J. 116, 116-17 (1989); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path
Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 205-24 (1995). For a
general summary, see Stephen E. Margolis & S. J. Liebowitz, Path Dependence,
http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/paigrave/palpd.html.
3 For a discussion of these issues, see generally supra note 2.
4 See CLAYrON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECH-
NOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL XV (2003) [hereinafter INNOVATOR'S Di-
LEMMA]; CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, SCOTT D. ANTHONY & ERIK A. ROTH, SEEING
WHAT'S NEXT: USING THE THEORIES OF INNOVATION TO PREDICT INDUSTRY CHANGE
129 (2004) [hereinafter SEEING WHAT'S NEXT].
5 See INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA, supra note 4, at xix-xxiv; SEEING WHAT'S NEXT,
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centration with barriers to entry, market power, and high fares.7
In the late 1990s it appeared to many observers that the airline
industry had reached an undesirable lock-in condition.8 Air-
craft technology seemed largely stagnant,9 and free market
forces seemed to have failed to challenge the dominant business
model of the major incumbent airlines and their increasing
market power. 0 Antitrust and other regulatory efforts were
launched against the major airlines.'"
Then, in the early 2000s, significant low-cost entry appeared,
as if from nowhere, challenging the hegemony of the major in-
cumbents and tipping the industry in a different direction.12
With hindsight, the antitrust and regulatory concerns and ac-
tions of the late 1990s may seem misplaced.13
This paper discusses aspects of the U.S. commercial aviation
industry using some general insight of dynamic views of technol-
ogy and industry evolution. I will focus on the interaction and
co-evolution of aircraft technology and airline markets, empha-
7 See generally Antitrust Issues in the Airline Industry: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Com., Sci, & Transp., 106th Cong. 1 (2000) (statement ofJoel I. Klein, Asst. Att'y
Gen., Antitrust Div., Dept. of Justice) (hereinafter Klein).
8 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOT-RCED-98-112, AIRLINE COMPE-
TITION: BARRIERS TO ENTRY CONTINUE IN SOME DOMESTIC MARKETS 1-4 (1998),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98112t.pdf.
9 See, e.g., Ilan Kroo, Innovations in Aeronautics, 2004 AIAA Dryden Lecture 1
(Jan. 5-8, 2004), http://aero.stanford.edu./Reports/AAA20040001b.pdf.
10 Service Problems and Limited Competition Continue in Some Markets: Testimony
Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 105th Cong. 1-2 (1998) [herein-
after Service Problems] (statement of John H. Anderson, Jr., Director, Transporta-
tion Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office).
11 These efforts included a 1999 lawsuit against American Airlines and others,
alleging predatory conduct in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. United
States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 2003), affg, 140 F. Supp. 2d
1141 (D. Kan. 2001) (filed May 13, 1999). Another effort included proposals to
amend Title 49 U.S.C., which were introduced in 2001. Airline Competition and
Passenger Rights Act of 2001, H.R. 907, 107th Cong. (2001); Airline Passenger
Bill of Rights Act, H.R. 1734, 107th Cong. (2001). These bills never became laws.
A third effort was made by the Department of Transportation. See U.S. Dep't of
Transp., Proposed Statement of Enforcement Policy on Unfair Exclusionary Con-
duct by Airlines (Apr. 6, 1998), http://www.dot.gov/affairs/1998/dot6398a.htm.
12 Despite Industry Turmoil, Low-Cost Airlines Are Growing and Profitable: Testimony
Before the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter LCAs Are Growing and Profitable] (statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director,
Physical Infrastructure).
13 1 focus on describing and interpreting the industry evolution leaving the
normative analysis of antitrust and regulation policies outside the scope of the
article. For a -discussion on policy implications, see, e.g., ELDAD BEN-YOSEF, THE
EVOLUTION OF THE US AIRLINE INDUSTRY: THEORY, STRATEGY AND POLICY 2, 279
(2005).
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sizing the dynamic relationship between innovation and compe-
tition in the aircraft market and the airline market.' 4 i attempt
to put a complex and turbulent reality into a general, abstract
picture, emphasizing the major industry trends. In a manner
typical of interpreting the behavior of complex dynamic systems,
I believe I can tell quite a persuasive tale of the past (with hind-
sight!). Telling the future, however, is a different story. In this
respect I will suggest possible, tentative directions for-or raise
some questions regarding-the unfolding future of the
industry.
II. LOCK-IN
During most of the 1990s, there was a general consensus that
aircraft technology and related aircraft and airline markets and
infrastructures were locked into dominant positions.' 5 In the
airline market, hub-and-spoke networks became the dominant
business model, and a small number of winning airlines ruled
the skies.16 In the aircraft manufacturing market, Boeing estab-
lished its market might as the dominant aircraft builder.'7
There were clear relationships between airlines, aircraft technol-
ogy, and market structure.' Turboprop technology dominated
the smaller-than 100-seat short-haul aircraft category, and turbo-
fan jet technology dominated the larger-than 100-seat cate-
gory.19 Major incumbent airlines operated turbofan jet aircraft
and controlled regional affiliates that operated mostly turbo-
prop technology. 20 The major jet builders were not interested
in competing for the relatively low-margin turboprop section of
14 1 use the term aircraft market (or industry) to refer to the aircraft as input,
and airline market (or industry) to refer to air travel services produced with air-
craft. I focus on the U.S. airline industry.
15 Kroo, supra note 9.
16 American, United, and Delta emerged as the dominant airlines. See BEN-
YOSEF, supra note 13, at 7.
17 In the summer of 1997, the European Commission approved the merger of
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, clearing the way for its implementation. News
Release, Boeing, Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger Gains a Postive Opinion
from the European Commission (July 23, 1997), http://www.boeing.com/news/
releases/i 997/news.release.970723.html.
IS See Richard H.K. Vietor, The Hubris of Regulated Competition: Airlines 1925-88,
in REGUtATION: ECONOMIC THEORY AND HISTORY 19, 19-58 (Jack High ed., 1991).
19 See, e.g., EDITORS OF AVIATION DAILY AND AEROSPACE DAILY, THE AVIATION &
AEROSPACE ALMANAC: 2001 EDITION (2001).
20 Wikipedia, Regional Airline, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_
airlines (as of Sept. 13, 2007, 2:50 CST).
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the market, and this class of aircraft was designed and built by
an independent group of manufacturers.
Boeing's leadership position in the large aircraft manufactur-
ing industry seemed unquestionable. In 1997, it acquired Mc-
Donnell Douglas and the civil jet aircraft manufacturing
industry became a duopoly. Airbus expanded its aircraft offer-
ings and gained in market share, yet Boeing's position as the
dominant airplane builder seemed secure. During the 1990s,
Boeing introduced only one clean-sheet aircraft design-the
777. 2 1 The main revolutionary innovation relating to the design
of this aircraft involves changes in process technology-this aircraft
was designed in a novel way, using three-dimensional digital-
aided tools.22 Other product innovations during the 1990s were
mainly of incremental changes to existing base-line aircraft tech-
nology.23 During this period, powerful computers drove the
most noticeable innovations in airline technology as well. Major
airlines put enormous efforts into developing and using com-
plex revenue (yield) management systems.24
21 Boeing Co., History: The Boeing Logbook: 1988-1992, http://www.boeing.
com/history/chronology/cronl4.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2007). Three cate-
gories of product (aircraft) innovations are usually distinguished by the industry:
derivative, variant, and clean-sheet design. The latter involves creating a new
base-line design (the introduction of the 707 or 777, for example). The former
involves differentiation within a given base-line design. 737-300 and 737-400, for
example, are two variants of the same base-line platform. The 737NG aircraft
family, on the other hand, is a derivative of the previous generation 737Classic
family, involving incremental changes in the base-line platform. Clean-sheet de-
sign is not necessarily a radical product innovation. The introduction of the 707
was a radical innovation in relation to the previously dominant piston engine
technology. The introduction of a clean-sheet design 777 is an incremental prod-
uct innovation relative to the 747 or 767, for example.
22 Boeing Co., Commercial Airplanes-777 Computing & Design, htpp://www.
boeing.com/commercial/777family/pf/pLconputing.html (last visited Sept. 13,
2007). New computer-aided 3D design and management tools were used to de-
velop the prototype. Id. CATIA software became the dominant standard tool for
design. Boeing Co., Computing & Design: CATIA Development, http://wmw.
boeing.com/commercial/777family/compite/compute4.html.
23 See, e.g., Kroo, supra note 9, at 2.
24 For a technical summary of research in this area (from an Operating Re-
search point of view), see, e.g., KALYAN T. TALLURI & GARRETTr J. VAN RYZIN, THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REVENUE MANAGEMENTr (2004); Peter P. Belobaba, Air-
line Network Revenue Management: Recent Developments and State of the Practice, in
HANDBOOK OF AIRLiNE ECONOMICS 141, 141-56 (ed. 2002); Jeffrey I. McGill &
Garrett J. Van Ryzin, Revenue Management: Research Overview and Prospects, 33
TRANSP. Sci., 233, 233-56 (1999). For a general economic analysis, see, e.g., BEN-
YOSEF, supra note 13, at 213-37.
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The dominance of Boeing and Airbus appeared unchallenge-
able because of the enormous barriers to entry into the large
commercial aircraft building business. 5 Similarly, the major
network airlines and their complex hub-and-spoke network
strategies appeared to block any meaningful new entry or any
radical changes in the air travel market structure.26 Only major
incumbent airlines acquired and operated new turbofan air-
craft, and innovation in aircraft technology enhanced their com-
petency. 27 There was no successful and sustained new entry into
the airline market-in spite of many attempts-except for the
phenomenal expansion and success of Southwest Airlines. 21
The industry history proved time and again that new startup en-
try is doomed to fail. 29 The tragic accident of a DC9 aircraft
flown by the most significant new entry of the 1990s-
ValueJet-enhanced the public perception that 'old' technol-
ogy aircraft, which had traditionally been used by new, under-
capitalized entrants, represent a major safety challenge."
Pushed by public opinion, the FAA made startup entry and ag-
ing aircraft major targets for safety regulations.3 ' New entry into
the airline market became extremely challenging.3 2
Antitrust proponents believed that the airline market was ap-
proaching a condition akin to the static model of a monopoly
and that market creativity failed to challenge the power of the
incumbent airlines.3 A wide use of price discrimination (yield
2-5 SeeTzu-Ching Horng, A Comparative Analysis of Supply Chain Management
Practices by Boeing and Airbus: Long-term Strategic Implications 26 (Feb. 2007),
(unpublised M.S. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), available at
http://lean.mit.edu/index.php?option=com docman&task=doc-view&gid= 1281
&Itemid=88.
2 See, e.g., Service Problems, supra note 10, at 1-2.
27 Vietor, supra note 18, at 19-58.
28 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 61, 241-42.
29 STEVEN A. MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY 7 (1995).
-3, Steve Huettel, 10 Years After Tragedy, AirTran Flies On, ST. PETERSBERC TIMES,
May 11, 2006, at IA. Used aircraft (of current or previous generations) have
usually been considerably less expensive to acquire and therefore were used by
startup entrants in order to reduce entry costs. BEN-VOSEF, supra note 13, at 101
n.37, 241.
31 Id. at 241-42.
32 Id.
-3 For DOT position, see, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., PROPOSED STATEMENT OF
ENFORCEMENT POLICY REGARDING UNFAIR EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IN THE AIR
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY (1998), http://Nv.dot.gov/affairs/dkt3713.htm.
For DQJ position, see, e.g., Klein, supra note 7. For general policy analysis, see, e.g.,
Clinton V. Oster, Jr. & John S. Strong, Competition and Antitrust Policy, in HAND-
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management) techniques increased the major airlines' profits
and their reliance on a relatively small group of high-willingness-
to-pay passengers to produce a disproportionally large part of
their revenues. 4 Regulators and antitrust officials believed that
the major network airlines exercised their market power by, on
the one hand, charging monopolistic hub premiums and, on
the other hand, fighting and deterring new entry attempts by
predatory threats and practices.1 An unprecedented number
of antitrust and regulatory initiatives were launched during this
period."' In the late 1990s most observers expressed surprise at
the trajectory that the industry had adopted and questioned the
validity of the basic premise that the airline industry is naturally
competitive:
The unfolding of two 'revolutions' in two different market
sections was quite surprising, given the general background de-
picted above. The first is traceable to the early 1990s and the
second to the late 1990s. I refer to the first revolution as the
short-haul or regional-market revolution and to the second as the
medium-haul low-cost revolution. In both cases, significant market
changes with a potential for long-term dynamic effects have
been unfolding. 8 In both cases, potential disruptive innovations
in the airline market-starting as a marginal entry with a slight
chance of success, according to most industry observers-came
to redefine respective market niches. 9 Changes have emerged
in non-continuous and somewhat surprising ways in response to
long co-evolving dynamic processes of innovations in technol-
BOOK OF AIRLINE STRATEGY 3, 3-34 (Gail F. Butler & Martin R. Keller eds., 2001);
Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Remaining Role for Government Policy in
the Deregulated Airline Industy, in DEREGULAT[ION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT
NEXT? 1, 1-40 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000).
44 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 7.
3-5 Id. at 243.
36 Id.
37 Senator Hollings provided a vivid description of the industry: "... the result
[of deregulation] is what we have today-a balkanization of our aviation system-
16 major hubs dominated by one carrier. New entry, real new entry is virtually
unheard of, and people in small communities now have little choice in airfares
(which are too high)." Antitrust Issues in Airline Industry: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Commc'n, Sci. & Transp., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Sen. Hol-
lings, Member, S. Comm. on Commc'n, Sci., & Transp.).
'1 For simplicity of exposition I broke down the market into three general sec-
tions: short-haul, medium-hatl, and long-haul.
39 See BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 242; SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at
xxvii.
20071
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ogy, regulations, and markets." In both cases, the interaction
and co-evolution of innovations in aircraft and airline technolo-
gies created significant market changes and new competitive
dynamics.4
In the mid 2000s, it became apparent that a potential for a
third revolution in the long-haul market was about to gain
steam.42 This third revolution is directly related to innovations
in new aircraft designed for the long-haul market section, as well
as the airline industry response to this new technology, as major
incumbents and new entrants are preparing for a battle for
dominance over this market section.
III. THE SHORT-HAUL (REGIONAL) REVOLUTION
The emergence of the hub-and-spoke network as a dominant
post-deregulation business model enabled the migration of oth-
erwise financially struggling regional airlines to a new market
niche.44 Concomitantly, for the first time since the introduction
of jet engine technology four decades earlier, the concept of
small (fifty-seat) jets gained large-scale commercialization.45
The regional jet revolution destroyed the traditional industry
perception that small regional jets are inefficient because of
their comparative unit cost disadvantage. 46 The introduction of
40 See SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 132.
41 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 247-48; see Boeing Co., Commercial Airplanes:
787 Dreamliner Background, http://wv.boeing.com/commercial/787family/
background.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
42 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at xxiii.
43 See Richard Aboulafia, Air Bus vs. Boeing: Year Four, AEROSPACE AM., Nov.
2001, available at http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Article.cfm?isssuetocid=151.
44 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 7, 10.
45 Douglas Abbey, The Impact of Regional Jets on North American Air Service Develop-
ment, in HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE STRATEGY 525, 525-36 (Gail F. Butler & Martin R.
Keller eds., 2001).
46 Matt Bennett, Showdown in Regional Aviation, 17 MERCER MGMT. J. 78, 78-80
(2004). Small jets cost less to operate on per-flight basis, but more on per-seat/
mile basis, in comparison to mainline aircraft. Id. at 78-79. Most costs are fixed
in relation to the (smaller) number of seats and the (shorter) flying stage-lengths
compared to mainline aircraft. There are various operational and technical rea-
sons for this, including: 1) regional jets operate shorter stage lengths and thus
spend a disproportional part of their block hours of operation on high energy
consuming activities-on the ground (taxiing and maneuvering), taking-off, and
climbing to altitude, relative to mainline aircraft; 2) smaller engines are less en-
ergy-efficient mostly because of a smaller and less efficient compressor section
even at high by-pass ratios; 3) structure is heavier and therefore aircraft less effi-
cient, mostly because engine weights do not scale linearly with thrust so that
small engines have lower thrust-to-engine weight ratios.
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the small jets eliminated the traditional dominance of turbo-
prop technology in the regional market.47 The high unit cost of
operating the small jets was justified by their contribution to the
overall revenues of the major incumbent networks.48
This market opportunity was seized by a small group of execu-
tive-jet and turboprop-aircraft manufacturers who developed de-
rivatives of existing aircraft models to create (and fit into) the
new market niche." These manufacturers migrated from their
traditional markets into a newly redefined and expanding niche
of building small commercial passenger jets. 5') The incremental
innovation and new application of existing standard technology
enabled the development and design costs of the newjets to stay
low. 5' An important element in powering this revolution was
the design of an efficient small engine family by General Electric
(GE CF36), a derivative of a widely used military engine.52
The emerging dominant regional jet-builders (Bombardier
and Embraer) sustained up-market innovation and increased
the size of their jets from 50-seat to 70-seat and to 100-seat, mov-
ing into the traditional low-cost, low-margin territory of the
dominant large-aircraft builders.5 " Engrossed in fierce competi-
tion, Boeing and Airbus were busy building large and expensive
aircraft and were not attracted to the low-margin section of the
market, nor did they seem bothered by the new entry. 54 Con-
47 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., THE U.S. JET TRANSPORT IN-
DUSTRY: COMPETITION, REGULATION AND GLOBAL MARKET FACTORS AFFECTING U.S.
PRODUCERS 20 (2005) [hereinafter JET INDUSTRY]; U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., PRO-
FILE: REGIONAL JETS AND THEIR EMERGING ROLES IN THE U.S. AVIATION MARKET 5
(1998) [hereinafter EMERGING REGIONAL JETs].
48 Bennett, supra note 46, at 78-79.
49 Id. Bombardier developed its executive jet Challenger and Embraer its tur-
boprop commuter Brasilia into families of new regional jet aircraft. EMERGING
REGIONAL JETS, supra note 47, at 7; Andreas Spaeth, Embraer Regional Jet Family
Success Story, FLUG REVUE, Mar. 2000, at 3, available at http://vv.flug-
revue.rotor.com/frheft/FR0003d.htm.
5o See SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 132.
5I See, e.g., Embraer-Empresa Brasileria de Aeronautica S.A., The Company
Profile, http://www.embraer.com/english/content/empresa/profile.asp (last
visited Sept. 13, 2007).
52 See Gen. Elec. Co. Aviation, The CF34 Engine Family, http://www.geae.
com/engines/commercial/cf34/index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
53 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 132-33. See Embraer Empresa
Brasileria de Aeronautica S.A., Embraer Commercial Jets-EOJeb: Efficiency,
http://v-v.embraercommercialjets.com/english/content/ejeb/default.asp.?te
la=efficiency (last visited Sept. 24, 2007); Bombadier Inc., http://wwV.
bombardier.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
54 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 132.
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comitantly, the regional airlines expanded their market niche,
capturing parts of the traditional mainline markets. 5- The move
to larger jets improved the aircraft unit cost and the economic
performance of the regional airlines.56
Major incumbent airlines encouraged and facilitated the
growth of the regional airlines, integrating them into their net-
work systems while enjoying the benefits ofjoint-production and
outsourcing synergies. 7 The regional airlines have significantly
consolidated since deregulation and operate almost exclusively
in affiliation with major incumbents. 58 The mode of integration
between the majors and the regional affiliates varies and has
changed over time.59 Several majors own their affiliates; several
use market contracts and other combinations of the two
modes.6 ° A few regional airlines serve more than one major air-
line.6" The regional airlines with their new jets became an inte-
gral part of the complex hub-and-spoke network system,
expanding its reach and enhancing its pricing power.6 2
The economic crisis of the early 2000s, the impact of the Sep-
tember 11 events, and high oil prices hit the major airlines hard,
forcing them to shrink while concurrently accelerating the
5- JET INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 12; SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 144.
56 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-344, REGIONAL JET SERVICE YET
TO REACH MANY SMALL COMMUNITIES 5, 22-23 (2001), [hereinafter SMALL COM-
MUNITIES], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01344.pdf; ALE, SANDRA
MOZDZANOWSKA & R. JOHN HANSMAN, OBSERVATIONS AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF
REGIONAL JET OPERATING TRENDS 8 (2003), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/
bitstream/1721.1/35865/1/amerc-July2003-Montreal.pdf; Bennett, supra note
46, at 78-79. The expansion of the regional airlines was constrained by strong
labor unions' objections to outsourcing as reflected in the scope clauses of the
labor agreements. See MOZDZANOWSKA & HANSMAN, supra, at 8. These objections
were relaxed (but not completely eliminated) especially after the bankruptcy fil-
ings of several of the major airlines. See id.




61 The number of regional airlines decreased by over two-thirds between 1981
and 2003 (from 250 to 79). U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FAA, AEROSPACE FORECASTS:
FY 2003-2004 IV-6 (2002) [hereinafter FAA FORECASTS 2003-2014], available at
http://wv-.faa.gov/datastatistics/aviation/aerospaceforecasts/2003-2014/.
In 2002, ten regionals were fully owned by eight major airlines. Id. American
Airlines uses only fully owned regionals, United uses only independent regionals,
and the other major airlines use a mix of owned and independent regionals.
Operational integration is governed by code-share agreements. Id. at 111-17. The
top five regional corporate groups accounted for 59% of takeoffs and the top
twenty for 98.1% in 2002. Id. at IV-6.
62 SMALL COMMUNITIES, supra note 56, at 18.
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growth of the regional airlines."' The traditional hub-and-spoke
business model lost its strategic magic in the face of plummeting
demand, strong new low-cost competition, and dissipating pric-
ing power."4 The regional airlines, with their increasing fleets
and aircraft size, and their low-cost structure (including but not
limited to labor costs), assumed a new strategic role in the major
incumbents' battle for survival.15 Regional airlines were substi-
tuted for an increasing portion of mainline operations and were
positioned by the majors to compete with new low-cost entrants
in the medium haul." The medium-haul revolution (to be dis-
cussed next), in fact, accelerated the expansion of the regional
airlines and their migration into the traditional mainline
market."7
This trend was perceived by labor unions as a threat to job
security, and was a central issue of contention in labor bargain-
ing.6" The strategic importance of the regionals increased, how-
ever, and managements of major airlines were pressured to
accelerate the outsourcing of business to their regional affiliates
in order to cut costs, maintain market presence, and respond to
an unprecedented low-cost competition."9 Labor union opposi-
tion notwithstanding, the regionals have increased the size of
their fleets, the size of their aircraft, and have expanded their
reach to longer-haul routes and to new markets." '
The expansion of the regional airlines increased the depen-
dency and cooperation of major and regional airlines, as well as
the potential for conflicts. 7 Conflicts became more apparent as
the majors became weaker and were forced to cut costs and shift
revenues from the regional.7 2 Starting in the early 2000s, re-
gionals were forced to accept amendments and changes in their
affiliation contracts, reducing the level of payments and assum-
63 LCAs Are Growing and Profitable, supra note 12, at 18.
64 See id. at 5.
65 See id. at 1-2, 5, 9-10.
66 Between 2000 and 2005, low-cost carriers increased their capacity 139.3%,
RPMs 180.8%, and enplanements 84.1%. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FAA AEROSPACE
FORECASTS: FISCAL YEARS 2006-2017 14 (2005) [hereinafter FAA FORECAST 2005],
available at http://w w.faa.gov/datastatistics/aviation/aerospaceforecasts/
2006-2017/media/FAA%2OAerospace % 20Forecasts.pdf.
67 For a discussion of the operating trends of the regional airlines, see, e.g.,
MOZIZANOWSKA, supra note 56, at 8.
68 Id. at 8.
69 Id. at 6-8.
70 FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at 14.
71 See SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 145; Bennett, supra note 46, at 80.
7,2 Bennett, supra note 46, at 80.
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ing more risks.73 Several regionals were dragged by their major
affiliates into bankruptcy courts. 4
Can the two groups continue growing in harmony? Can re-
gional airlines maintain their lower cost structure? There is a
natural conflict between two integrated organizations with two
tiers of remuneration, especially when the income of one organ-
ization is an expenditure of the other (moreover, the more prof-
itable organization pays its respective employees less, and
pressures to increase remuneration may cause its cost advantage
to erode).75
Winning regional airlines are expected to sustain their up-
market trajectory and further expand into the majors' tradi-
tional markets using larger jets. 76 It appears that major airlines
will continue outsourcing an increasing part of their short- and
medium-haul operations, up to the 100-seat aircraft category, to
expanding affiliated or spun-off regionals in spite of labor union
objections. 77 Will regionals grow to disrupt majors?78 The intro-
duction of regional jets in the 100-seat category broke down the
traditional distinction between small and large jet aircraft and
the traditional distinction between the regional and mainline
markets.79 Specializing regional airlines dominate the opera-
tion of the 50- and 70-seat category aircraft. ° Regional and
mainline operators have acquired and operate the 100-seat cate-
gory aircraft and it is not clear yet which group would dominate
this category.8'
IV. THE MEDIUM-HAUL LOW-COST REVOLUTION
The hub-and-spoke network model became the target of a
new wave of competitive battles by a new group of low-cost star-
73 Id. Traditional fee schedules involved fixed payment per trip, providing the
regional with a stable income and a shield from market risks.
74 For example, Mesaba is a Northwest affiliate and Comair is a Delta affiliate.
75 See SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 146.
76 FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at 30, 32.
77 FAA FORECASTS 2003-2014, supra note 61, at IV-7, IV-8.
78 The first attempt of a successful regional airline to separate from its major
affiliate and migrate into national markets ended in bankruptcy liquidation (In-
dependence Air). Bill Brubaker, Flyi Is Latest Airline in Bankruptcy Protection,
WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2005, at A01.
79 SeeJET INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 12; Bennett, supra note 46, at 80.
so See SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 132-33.
81 JetBlue and US Airways have ordered Embraer E-190. JET INDUSTRY, supra
note 47, at 41.
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tup airlines in the early 2000s. s 2 This new group identified ma-
jor cracks in the incumbents' dominant business model and
attacked it while the latter airlines were struggling with the after-
math of the September 11 events, and the subsequent unprece-
dented economic crisis." : Incumbent airlines were forced to
contract while low-cost airlines persistently expanded.8 4 New
successful entry and expansion, coupled with an unprecedented
industry-wide economic crisis, forced the major incumbents to
rethink and change their dominant strategy for the first time
since deregulation. s
Complex hub-and-spoke networks were forced to shrink, and
flight frequencies were reduced and spread more evenly over
the day in the face of sustained low-cost competition. 6 Low-cost
competition and increasing fare transparency through internet
resources weakened the major incumbents' power of fencing
potential buyers and using discriminating fare techniques. 87
Traditional yield management lost its power.88 The major in-
cumbent airlines lost their fare-setting power, and pricing lead-
ership in this market-section shifted to the new entrants."9
A. THE SOUTHWEST PHENOMENON
The term "low-cost airline" has become a catchall name for
post-deregulation new entry and, in fact, disguises diverse air-
lines and heterogeneous strategies. It was first used in connec-
tion with the outstanding success of Southwest Airlines.9 °
82 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 17.
83 LCAs Are Growing and Profitable, supra note 12, at 4-5; BEN-YOSEF, supra note
13, at 7.
84 Between the beginning of 2000 and the end of 2005 major incumbent air-
lines reduced domestic capacity by 14.9%. Low-cost airlines (including South-
west but not including regionals) increased their capacity by 50.8%. LCAs Are
Growing and Profitable, supra note 12, at 4-5; FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at
14.
85 See FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at 5.
86 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 246.
87 See LCAs Are Growing and Profitable, supra note 12, at 3-4.
88 See FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at 5.
89 For summary and analysis of the low cost airlines, see, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., THE Low COST AIRLINE SERVICE REVOLUTION 4-30 (1996), available at
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/Data/lowcostrevo.pdf. For aggregate fare
trends, see, e.g., Severin Borenstein, U.S. Domestic Airline Pricing, 1995-2004 1-4
(Competition Policy Ctr., Working Paper No. CPC05-48, 2005), available at http:/
/ repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1048&con text=iber/cpc.
91 Southwest was a small local airline during the regulation regime. It consist-
ently expanded after deregulation to become one of the largest U.S. major air-
lines. I use the term major incumbents to refer to all pre-deregulation major
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Southwest designed an inferior product, using different lower-
cost production and sale processes compared to the dominant
business model of the major incumbents."-' In many respects,
the Southwest model has been in binary opposition, a mirror
image, of the dominant one. Southwest targeted smaller, secon-
dary airports that were not served by the major airlines, offering
a generic substitute service, not directly focusing on the major
airlines' hubs or their main high-paying market base.92
There was a general sense of balanced coexistence, live and
let live, between Southwest and the majors, in spite of the consis-
tent and threatening growth of the former and its competitive
impact on fares." Fare levels have been significantly lower in
parallel markets served by both Southwest and incumbents.9 4
There was usually, however, no fierce all-out competition or in-
tense direct cutthroat fare wars.95
For over two decades, Southwest has largely stuck to its win-
ning strategy and has not launched direct aggressive efforts
against the majors' main hub markets or their high-paying pas-
sengers.96 An important part of the success of Southwest is asso-
ciated with developing new markets and expanding existing
ones with no massive efforts at directly displacing incumbents'
core service.97 Yet, as it has grown and expanded to traditional
major airlines' territory, especially in the East Coast (Philadel-
phia, Baltimore, and Dulles Washington), Southwest has be-
come a more direct and imminent threat to the incumbents. 8
B. THE Low-CoST REVOLUTION
By the late 1990s the major incumbents were locked-in to
their winning strategies, generating outstanding revenues for al-
airlines except Southwest. These airlines are also sometime called legacy, net-
work, or hub-and-spoke airlines.
91 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 138-39.
92 Id. at 138. For an extensive bibliography list, see the Southwest website.
Southwest Airlines, Bibliography, http://www.southwest.com/about-swa/press/
bibliography.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
93 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 138-39; RANDALL D. BENNETT &JAMES
M. CRAUN, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION EVOLUTION CON-
TINUES: THE SOUTHWNEST EFFECT 3-4 (1993) [hereinafter SOUTHWEST EFFET]
available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/x-50%2ORole_files/southwest%20
Effect.doc.
94 SOUTHWEST EFFECT, supra note 93, at 6-8.
95 Id.
96 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 138-39.
97 Id. at 138.
98 Id. In 2004, Southwest directly attacked the US Airways hub in Philadelphia.
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most half a decade. In addition, they were busy aggressively bar-
gaining with labor unions that were trying to extract a share in
the financial success of the period. '9 Over two decades of labor
bargaining failed to adjust labor costs and rigid work rules-
which have been an enduring legacy of the regulation regime-
to reflect the competitive threats of the deregulated market."'
The incumbents were slow to recognize and react to the emerg-
ing new threats. "" They fell into the same trap that many in-
cumbent firms fell into before them-inertial continuation of
their dominant winning strategy that turned into failure.l' This
was particularly evident in fare (yield) management.'0 3 They
kept using the same fare discrimination strategies and assump-
tions, blind to market changes that had eroded their ability to
segment and fence passengers into fare categories. 1°4 They con-
tinued plugging-in mechanically generated demand-estimates
produced by their traditional computer models in a manner
that, in fact, reduced and spiraled-down their revenues." 5 They
lost touch with their full-fare paying passengers who believed
that they were being cheated or otherwise paying too much, and
they ignored low-fare paying passengers who were frustrated
with encumbering restrictions attached to their tickets."1 6 They
were also slow to adapt to the new internet technology and to
realize its potential negative impact on their ability to discrimi-
nate fares using traditional distribution channels.0 7
Then, starting in the early 2000s, after two decades of deregu-
lation and practically no successful new entry, a new wave of suc-
cessful entry and expansion emerged, tipping the traditional
industry balance.0 8 This new wave of expanding low-cost entry,
on top of the consistent expansion of Southwest, and given the
9 See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS, INFORMATION
ON TRENDS AND IMPACT OF LABOR ACTIONS 13 (2003) [hereinafter AIRLINE LABOR
TRENDS], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03652.pdf.
100 See id. at 12-13.
101 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 136-37.
102 Id. at 137.
103 SOUTHWEST EFFECT, supra 93, at 3.
104 For an analytical exposure of the spiral down effect, see, e.g., William L.
Cooper, Tito Homem-de-Mello & Anton J. Kleywegt, Models of the Spiral-Down Ef
fect in Revenue Management, 54 OPERATIONS RES. 968, 968-69 (2006).
105 See id.
106 See id.
117 LCAs Are Growing and Profitable, supra note 12, at 3-4; BEN-YOSEF, supra note
13, at 18.
108 See BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 247, n.207. Included in this group are jet-
Blue, Air Tran, Spirit, Frontier, and ATA.
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specific timing and post-September 11 industry crisis, created a
direct and significant competitive blow to the majors, causing
them to lose a large share of their traditional medium-haul mar-
ket and their price leadership in this sector.' °9 While for over
two decades Southwest had slowly conquered secondary posi-
tions surrounding the major fortress hubs and their controlled
territory,110 the new low-cost entry took advantage of the unprec-
edented weakness of the incumbents and launched a frontal at-
tack on their main markets."1 The competitive impact of this
new startup attack has been considerably more significant than
its size.' 12
In 2003, Southwest was ranked second after Delta with respect
to total number of domestic enplanements; in 2004 it was
ranked first.'13 In 2004, JetBlue was categorized a major airline
by the Department of Transportation." 4 In 2005, Delta joined
US Airways, United, and Northwest in filing bankruptcy." 15
1. Innovation-Reducing Costs, Creating New Values
The term 'low-cost airline' hides a set of diverse and subtle
entry strategies that must be carefully interpreted. One should
not confuse the important direct cost advantage that is usually as-
sociated with this low-cost entry with the advantage they have
created by implementing innovative processes and flexible work
rules that further reduce costs and create new values." 6 This
strategy involves designing the product-and related produc-
tion and sale processes-differently, to provide high (or differ-
ent) values for overall lower costs. Most observers focus on
labor cost differences as the major comparative advantage of the
new startups." 7 While this advantage is extremely important, it
109 Id. at 7.
110 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 136-37.
111 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 7.
112 See FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at 5; Cooper et al., supra note 104, at
968; SOUTHWEST EFFECT, supra note 93, at 6-7.
113 Ben Mutzabaugh, Who Is the USA's Top Domestic Carrier?, USA TODAY, Nov.
15, 2005, available at http://wvv.usatoday.com/travel/flights/today/2005-1 1-15-
sky-archivenov14 x.htm.
114 U.S. Dep't of Transp., Airline Classification, http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/
aviation/airlineclassifications.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2007). "Major" airlines
are those generating operating revenues of more than $1 billion annually. Id.
115 See Press Release, Delta Air Lines, Inc., Delta Air Lines Files for Chapter 11
Reorganization to Address Financial Challenges (Sept. 14, 2005), http://news.
delta.com/printdoc.cfm?article_id=9861.
116 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 248.
117 Id. at 250.
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tells only part of the story. JetBlue may pay less for a respective
employee compared to Delta or United, for example. But Jet-
Blue and other entrants have also incorporated innovative
processes (including a wide range of outsourcing, a wide use of
internet technology, young aircraft fleets with high commonal-
ity, a simple dynamic pricing strategy, and more flexible work
rules) that changed its resource utilization, reduced overall
costs, increased productivity, and created a different product
with different values for passengers."' 8 JetBlue pays less to pro-
duce a seat on a flight; yet, the product is viewed as having a
higher value by its specific targeted market.'19 This new entry
model changed the traditional model of low-cost, low-quality
combination (you pay less and you get less) that dominated pre-
vious entry attempts. 21 1
New startup airlines took advantage and incorporated new in-
ternet technology into their operations. 12' This new technology
enabled, for the first time since deregulation, creating an effec-
tive channel of direct ticket sales, while avoiding the traditional
expensive distribution systems that were biased in favor of the
major incumbents. 122 Costs were significantly lowered by using
internet-based booking, ticketing, and check-in, as well as auto-
mated luggage check-in points (kiosks). 1' These cost reduc-
tions relate to reservation, booking, and ticketing systems and
personnel; travel agents' commission (traditionally 9%); and
traditional check-in counter personnel at the airport.124 In addi-
tion, the new technology enables direct and efficient personal
contact (emails), developing loyalty clubs, online sale of credit
cards, car rentals, hotel accommodations, and other travel re-
lated bundled services and bookings. It also provides a compre-
hensive passenger database for sale promotions and other
marketing efforts. 125
118 David Gillen, Airline Business Models and Networks: Regulation, Competition and
Evolution in Aviation Markets, 5 REv. OF NETWORK ECON. 366, 270-73 (2006).
'19 See, e.g., Benjamin Harrell, JetBlue Skies Ahead, YALE ECON. REV., 2005, http:/
/www.yaleeconomicreview.com/issues/fa112005/davidneeleman.
120 See id.
121 Gillen, supra note 118, at 373.
122 LCAs Are Growing and Profitable, supra note 12, at 3, 4.
123 Gillen, supra note 118, at 373.
124 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE AIRLINE TICKET Dis-
TRIBUTION INDUSTRY 1-4 (2003) [hereinafter E-TICKET IMPACT].
12-5 Barry C. Smith, et al., E-Commerce and Operations Research in Airline Planning,
Marketing, and Distribution, 31 INTERFACES 37, 43-44 (2001).
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These new processes have also changed product characteris-
tics and value. A passenger self-selects a fare from a menu of
flight and fare availability and a desirable seat assignment, all
from her home computer. 126 The passengers feel empowered
by making their own selections in addition to saving encounters
and frictions with reservation and other personnel (although at
times the new process creates confusion and friction of its
own). 1 27 A passenger prints her own boarding pass, can leave
her luggage at the airport curb (or at a kiosk), and walk straight
to the gate.1 28 The new process significantly cuts the time a pas-
senger must spend at the airport before boarding. It also
reduces traditional frictions with check-in counter personnel. 29
Many passengers find this to be a more desirable experience. 319
Add to this the new aircraft, direct TV or satellite radio, and
leather seats, and most passengers perceive a low-cost, high-
value product that is usually very challenging to create and is
appealing to a large market, including business travelers."'
Incumbents (including Southwest) were forced to respond to
this new entry by cutting direct costs and by innovating and
changing their traditional production and sales processes." 2
This is a challenging task for an incumbent that is locked-in to a
certain mode of operation-including existing labor agree-
ments, production and sale processes, technologies, institutions,
supply-chain relationships, and corporate culture-that has
evolved over a long history. 3' While it is too early to speculate
regarding the long-term survivability and success of any of the
new low-cost entrants, their market penetration is by all means
impressive, and their impact on major airlines and the overall
126 See Jetblue's website for an example. JetBlue Airways Corp., http://Aww.
jetblue.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
127 JetBlue, for example, installed reservation posts in home-stations operated
by housewives in Utah, significantly cutting the airline's costs while maintaining a
high quality service.
128 Wikipedia, Electronic Ticket, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_
ticket (as of Sept. 13, 2007 11:45 CST).
129 See id.
130 Id.
1,351 See Harrell, supra note 119.
132 David Armstrong, Southwest, Jetblue Lower Fares, Too, SAN FIA\NCISCO CHRON.,
July 21, 2007, available at http://sfgate.com/cfi-bin/article.cgi?f=c/a/2007/07/
21/BUGIR4BM31.DTL; Chris Woodyard, Pitting Southwest vs. Jetblue, USA TODAY,
July 5, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2003-07-05-biz-
travel-comparisonx.htm.
133 See BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 7.
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industry organization and innovation has been immense.'
The low-cost revolution is not only about an unprecedented suc-
cessfl market entry, but also about accelerating a trend of pro-
cess innovations that is pushing the industry toward a new
model of leaner production and new service standards.
2. The Role of New Aircraft
In the late 1980s, Airbus decided to enter the medium-haul
aircraft market that was overwhelmingly dominated by Boe-
ing. 3 5 Airbus implemented impressive and expensive new tech-
nologies in its design-especially in digital aircraft controls and
the use of composite materials-that translated into only incre-
mental product innovation with a small noticeable operational
economic impact, if any, compared to the competition.136 In
the late 1980s, the A320 was certified."3 7 A series of accidents
related to Airbus aircraft in general, and automated cockpit
technology in particular, made its market penetration even
more challenging. The A321-100 and A321-200 commenced
commercial flight during the second half of the 1990s, gaining
in popularity and market share, mostly outside the US."'
Boeing stopped production of the 727 and introduced its
737NG derivative family for which it implemented only con-
servative innovations.3 " It decided not to incorporate fly-by-wire
technology or aggressive use of composites for various reasons,
the most important among them being that the cost of incorpo-
rating these new technologies seemed to be unjustifiable eco-
nomically. 40 In addition, passengers did not perceive the
difference between hydraulic and digital control systems and
134 See FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at 5.
135 See Airbus S.A.S., Corporate Information-The Airbus Story-The Family
Grows, Airbus-About-History, http://www.airbus.com/en/corporate/people/
companyevolLtion/history/parL7.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
136 Id.
137 Id.
s8 Northwest was the launching U.S. airline for the A320. Braniff ordered a
large quantity of aircraft before ceasing operations. James Ott, Leisureair Strategy
Wins Charter Market Niche, AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 1, 1993, at 31; Car-
ole A. Shifrin, Northwest Agrees to Purchase Up to 100 Airbus A320s, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Oct. 6, 1986, at 34.
13S- See Boeing Co., News Features: Fast Facts: Boeing 727, www.boeing.com/
news/feature/sevenseries/727.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2007); Boeing Co., The
Boeing Next-Generation 737 Family, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/
737family/index.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
14( Boeing Counterattacks Airbus as Next-Generation 737 Rolls Out, AVIATION DAILY,
Dec. 10, 1996, at 397.
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were not ready to pay a premium for having these new technolo-
gies incorporated into their aircraft.'4 '
Not surprisingly, the two manufactures followed a textbook
example of price-centered competition over market shares with
their two similar products. 4 2 What turned out to be more sur-
prising, perhaps, is that Airbus assumed price leadership by ag-
gressively cutting prices in spite of Boeing's clear advantage in
lower (already sunk) development costs. 4 ' This intense compe-
tition between the manufacturers triggered a significant and un-
precedented downward trend in new aircraft prices and fueled
the low-cost revolution. 44
The economic slowdown of the late 1990s, the September 11
events, and the subsequent industry crisis, hurt the major in-
cumbents badly. 45 Orders for new aircraft were cancelled and
deliveries indefinitely delayed. 146 Downward rigid aircraft pro-
duction capacity and financially hurting incumbent airlines
forced Boeing and Airbus to focus on the new startup entrants
as the only significant potential demand for their production
lines. 147 Fierce competition between the major aircraft builders
over the medium-haul market caused new aircraft prices to
plummet and encouraged an unprecedented entry of new air-
lines operating new, very inexpensive aircraft. 48 The traditional
dominant model of 'new startup entry acquiring low-(owner-
ship) cost, old-generation aircraft' was replaced by a new entry
model. 149
Manufacturers have accommodated a worldwide movement of
entrepreneurs taking advantage of increased global deregula-
tion and liberalization and weak, financially struggling major in-
cumbents, with a huge fleet of new aircraft.1 50 The new aircraft
were acquired for very deep discounts relative to historic list
141 Michael Mecham, Boeing Translates 737 to Digital Era, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Oct. 6, 1997, at 48.
142 JET INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 12; Bennett, supra note 46, at 80.
143 See Horng, supra note 25, at 38.
144 For aspects of the strategic competition between Boeing and Airbus, see,
e.g., JOHN NEWHOUSE, BOEING VERSUS AIRBUS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE GREATEST
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION IN BUSINESS (2007); MATTHEW LYNN, BIRDS OF PREY:
BOEING VS. AIRBUS: A BATTLE FOR THE SKIES (1997).
145 BEN-VOSEF, supra note 13, at 7.
146 Id. at 246.
147 Id. at 248-49.
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prices, and with highly accommodative financial terms, warran-
ties, and technical support.'15  In addition, during the first sev-
eral years of operations, new aircraft require only minimal
maintenance costs and exhibit a high level of mechanical relia-
bility. 152 This 'honeymoon' period is, obviously, very helpful
during market penetration stages. 153
3. Point-to-Point vs. Hub-and-Spoke
The term point-to-point airline has become synonymous with
Southwest and the wave of low-cost new entry, while the term
hub-and-spoke is used to describe major incumbent airlines. 154
These two terms are somewhat misleading and must be carefully
interpreted. 155 It is important to note that Southwest and the
low-cost airlines have adopted a point-to-point strategy, but in
fact have created networks with one or more hubs.156 The major
incumbents, on the other hand, adopted a certain hub-and-
spoke strategy, yet, the majority of their flights connect nodes
point-to-point.'57 The term point-to-point signifies a mostly un-
bundled (one-way) simply priced, standard, no (or low) frill,
and homogeneous service. 158 This contrasts with the complex
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 For a discussion of the low-cost startup entry and the role of new aircraft,
see id. at 249-50.
154 U.S. Dep't of Transp., Airline Business Model, http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/
aviation/airlinebusinessmodel.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
155 To add confusion, the DOT/FAA defines hub airports according to en-
planements, disregarding the network structure or operational characteristics.
Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Dep't of Transp., Wat is a Hub? In TRANSPORTATION
STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT 2000, available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/
transportation-statisticsannualreport/2000/chapter4/enplanements at major
.us-airports-box.html.
156 See Dipasis Bhadra & Pamela Texter, Airline Networks: An Econometric Frame-
work to Analyze Domestic U.S. Air Travel, 7 J. OF TRANSP. & STATISTICS 1 (2006)
[hereinafter Airline Networks], available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/
journal of transportation-andstatistics/volume07number 01/html/paper_
06/ (a publication of the Bureau of Transp. Statistics) (last visited Sept. 13,
2007). Three generic network structures are often distinguished in the network
literature and are relevant to our discussion: 1) a central (or major) hub network,
all traffic flows through one central hub (star), all traffic except for hub origins
and destinations require connections; 2) a decentralized network, consists of sev-
eral smaller centralized hubs; and 3) a distributed network, which has no central-
ized hubs. For a non-technical review of network theory, see, e.g., ALBERT-LASZLO
BARABASI, LINKED: How EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED TO EVERYTHING ELSE AND
WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2003).
157 See Airline Networks, supra note 156.
158 Gillen, supra note 118, at 370-71.
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discriminatory fare schemes, round-trip bundled, high fre-
quency, sometimes-forcing hub connection, and purchase and
travel restrictions that are associated with the incumbents' tradi-
tional hub-and-spoke strategy. 159
Many observers perceive the industry's evolution as two stylis-
tic and binary opposite architectural standards competing over
dominance." There is a growing consensus among observers
that the hub-and-spoke airlines might disappear-going the way
of the dinosaurs. 6' It is important not to confuse the two stylis-
tic general network structures and their respective pros and
cons with the fact that certain incumbents that used hub-and-
spoke architecture strategically, in a specific manner, at a specific
point in time, have lost their traditional market positions. 1 2 It is
not the structure that broke down but its specific strategic appli-
cation by the major incumbents. 63 In addition, since evolving
network structure is a complex dynamic phenomenon, relating
to specific history, heterogeneous and changing demand, rigid
infrastructure constraints, evolving technology, and strategic in-
teraction among agents (and chance!), it does not look as if we
are facing a winner takes all competition between two alterna-
tives.1 64 It is also important to distinguish between the evolving
patterns of the overall industry network structure and the spe-
cific agents that are competing to capture markets, and their
strategic selection, interaction, and impact on the emerging
overall network structure.
Scheduled point-to-point and hub-and-spoke services co-exist
in transportation systems (railroad, bus, shuttle-bus/taxi).
Point-to-point service can be part of centralized, decentralized,
or distributed network structures. 65 Such flights may connect
nodes through centralized or decentralized hubs, or directly
159 Id. at 369-70.
160 See id. at 369.
161 Harry R. Weber, Are Big Carriers Like Dinosaurs?, DESERET NEWS, July 20,
2004, at E01, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/miqn4188/is_2004
0720/ai_ni1474373.
162 Gillen, supra note 118, at 374-75.
163 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 136-37.
164 Note in particular that physical infrastructural (groundside and airside
spaces) constraints, as well as the geographical distribution of hubs and respec-
tive demand preferences, impose a truncated hub and distributed network
structure.
165 Gillen, supra note 118, at 382-84.
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across a network.' It is important to note that a hub-and-spoke
usually describes a network structure, while point-to-point de-
scribes a connection between two nodes." 7 A hub-and-spoke
structure is composed of point-to-point connections.'" 8 A set of
nodes connected to one central hub airport makes a star shaped
hub network, yet flights may or may not be made compatible for
connection by the airline or may not be desirable for passen-
gers.' 69  The ratio of point-to-point to connection-requiring
flights in a given hub-and-spoke structure is affected mostly by
flight compatibility (mostly through scheduling), passenger
preferences, competing point-to-point and other alternatives,
and fares.' 7 ° Roughly 30% of hub directed traffic during the
high hub-and-spoke period of the 1990s was associated with
catching connecting flights.' 7 ' A significant part of this traffic
was generated by the economies of hub-and-spoke networks-
connecting smaller markets that otherwise could not support
point-to-point traffic. 17 2
In 1993, 32% of all passengers on domestic flights made con-
nections, compared to 28% in 1978, before deregulation. 173
This was not a big change, in spite of the post-deregulation stra-
tegic move to a hub-and-spoke model. Southwest, the pioneer of
the point-to-point concept, in its annual statements during the
early 2000s, reported that over 20% of its operations involved
connecting flights. 174 It is expected that the portion of South-
west's connecting flights will keep growing following its code
share agreement with ATA in 2005.175
166 See, e.g., Bruce J. Holmes, NASA, & John Scott, Icosystems, Presentation at
the 2004 Integrated Communications Navigation and Surveillance (ICNS) Con-
ference: Transportation Network Topologies (Apr. 26, 2004), http://spacecom.
grc.nasa.gov/icnsconf/docs/2004/01-plenary/PS-06-Holmes.pdf.
167 This point may be obvious, but there seems to be much confusion about
this distinction.
16S See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ENFORCEMENT POLICY REGARDING UNFAIR EXCLU-
SIONARY CONDUCT IN THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 24-25 (2001).
169 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 45, 254-55; Gillen, supra note 118, at 369.
170 Gillen, supra note 118, at 370.
171 MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 29, at 22.
172 Id. at 22-23.
173 Id. at 22.
174 Southwest Airlines Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 4, 2002). In
general, the incumbents are expected to have more connecting flights since they
also operate smaller aircraft and connect smaller markets (regionals) that cannot
be efficiently served by Southwest's one-size, larger aircraft fleet.
175 See Southwest Airlines Co., ATA Codeshare, http://www.southwest.com/
travel_center/ata-codeshare.html [hereinafter ATA Codeshare] (last visited
Sept. 13, 2007).
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4. The Major Incumbent Networks
The major incumbents adopted integrated hub architecture
as a foundation of their post-deregulation strategy.'76 This strat-
egy was aimed at capturing dominant positions in the largest
and most dense national markets. 17 7 It also enabled a better
utilization of their existing rigid production capacity and high
cost structure. 78  The integrated hub provided economies in
connecting many spokes and enabled the capture of physical
control over limited groundside space (including gates) and air-
side space (including slots where applicable).' 79 A major inte-
grated hub became an essential facility, which, once captured by
an airline, created a regional monopolistic bottleneck.' s Coor-
dinating high frequency inbound and outbound flights, espe-
cially during peak demand periods, facilitated connectivity and
arguably enhanced product quality, while at the same time cre-
ating congestion and eliminating entry by competition.'
Moreover, overcapacity at a major hub deters entry by signaling
a potential aggressive incumbent's response to market penetra-
tion or expansion attempts. 18 2
Pricing strategy affects traffic flows over a network." 3 Reduc-
ing fares on certain connecting segments, for example, has a
system-wide impact on traffic and revenues.8 4 During the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, the incumbents made extensive use of
yield management techniques to maximize revenues. 8 5 They
often protected seats for late booking by high willingness-to-pay
passengers on otherwise higher fare point-to-point hub
flights.' 86 This strategy made point-to-point hub flights relatively
more expensive and encouraged or even forced low payers to
176 Gillen, supra note 118, at 367-68.
177 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 4.
178 Id. at 42.
179 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 34; Vietor, supra note 18, at 54.
180 Vietor, supra note 18, at 54.
181 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 254-55.
182 Id. at 34.
183 Gillen, supra note 118, at 370.
184 Id.
185 Yield Management Crucial in the 1990s, Says Consultant, AVIATION DAILY, Mar.
13, 1992, at 448. Initial yield management techniques focused on a single flight
leg; however, emphasis shifted during the second half of the 1990s towards an
overall network orientation. Id.




use connecting flights.18 7 This is an important point that is
often overlooked: fare strategies and yield management tech-
niques, in fact, contributed to an increased demand and use of
connecting flights on the existing hub-and-spoke network
structure.1I"
5. The Southwest Network
Southwest's network structure is an emerging outcome of its
business model, rather than a strategic selection. Southwest fo-
cused on specific secondary, smaller airports that were big
enough to sustain its operations of one aircraft type (the 737).1"9
It captured a leading position in each of the airports into which
it moved by increasing frequency of flights."l " Its network struc-
ture has emerged and changed over time in response to a con-
tinuing search for, and expansion into, adequate markets that
could support its model of operations. 91
The emerging Southwest network includes typical decentral-
ized multi-hub network elements as well as distributed network
elements. 92 Once the large hubs were captured and developed
by the major incumbents, smaller hubs were captured and devel-
oped by Southwest.'93 Adequate spokes were tied into this alter-
native network.'94 Over time, traffic in certain cities served by
Southwest has grown quite substantially, and smaller, yet quite
impressive hubs have emerged-for example, Dallas Love Field,
Phoenix, St. Louis, Las Vegas, Philadelphia, and Denver.' As
distributed node markets have grown, this network also devel-
oped direct node connection possibilities (not through
hubs).1 96 The code-share agreement into which Southwest re-
cently entered using larger and longer-range aircraft, enables a
new type of node connection that was not possible before-for
example. The code-share agreement with which Southwest re-
cently entered enables a new type of node connection that was
187 See id.
188 See BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 7.
189 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 138.
1g Id. at 137.
191 Id. at 138.
192 Southwest Airlines Co., Southwest Airlines Interactive Route Map, http://
www.southwest.com/travel center/routemap-dyn.html [hereinafter Southwest
Route Map] (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
193 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 137-38.
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not possible before-for example, by using larger and longer
range aircraft. 97
The main differences between the incumbents' and South-
west's networks are a consequence of the differences in the con-
straints of their respective selected airports (physical
infrastructure and market constraints) and pricing strategies. 98
Moreover, since Southwest operates one aircraft size, it entered
only certain airports and markets that support such operation,
and did not connect shorter-(regional) or longer-range nodes
into its network, which contrasts with incumbents that operate a
diverse aircraft mix. 199
6. The New Low-Cost Model
There is an advantage to using a simple point-to-point service
or building a simple small network in launching an attack on a
section of an incumbent's complex hub-network system. The
entrant does not have to duplicate-and sink enormous costs in
building-a complex hub-and-spoke network. It can cherry-pick
desirable points it wishes to serve based on cost or other advan-
tages it may have. In addition, price discrimination associated
with the large fixed-cost and low-marginal cost combination of a
complex hub-and-spoke system may attract entry. A new entrant
may respond with a strategy mix that includes lower fares (and/
or no restrictions on tickets) on a desirable point-to-point seg-
ment. This general strategy drove the entry of the new low-cost
airlines °.2 0
But these point-to-point airlines established, in fact, small
hubs or, at least, the basis for one or more hub structures.20 '
JetBlue, for example, identified a market opportunity in New
197 The code-share with ATA, for example, enables new types of connections.
See ATA Codeshare, supra note 175.
198 Gillen, supra note 118, at 370-71.
199 The characteristics of airline networks are different from the much studied
computer based networks. They have general scale-free and power law character-
istics but they are truncated and showing exponents of a considerably smaller
magnitude because of their infrastructure and demand constraints. Even the
largest incumbent hubs don't have more than 150 connections. Southwest's ex-
pansion strategy resembles in general the idea of a preferential attachment of
nodes into a dynamically evolving network" which creates a (self emerging) scale-
free hub network. Southwest, however, restricted itself to smaller airports and
markets and to one size aircraft. On network theory, see, e.g., Barabasi, supra note
156.
200 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 17-18, 248.
201 See Southwest Route Map, supra note 192.
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York and established a base in JFK; since then, it has been ad-
ding nodes to its New York hub and created a second hub in
Long Beach, California.20 2 In February 2003, just over two years
after starting service, it operated eighty daily flights from JFK to
Florida, twenty-two to upstate New York, and thirty-two to west-
ern U.S. destinations.2 °3 Its hub structure enables passengers to
connect to other destinations through the New York hub.204 Jet-
Blue is perceived as a point-to-point airline; yet, expanding
point-to-point service from its New York hub and increasing the
number of daily flights have created an increasing number of
possible compatible connections. JetBlue's decision to expand
by acquiring a large fleet of regional jets (EMB190) further sug-
gests expansion of its hub network.2 °5 Its location in New York
City-a major international port city-is ideal for feeding into
destinations over the Atlantic or connecting inbound traffic with
destinations in the United States.
It is important to emphasize that although JetBlue is per-
ceived as a point-to-point airline, it has, in fact, created a typical
hub-and-spoke network structure that is similar to (although ob-
viously significantly smaller than) the incumbents'. The above
description is by no means unique to JetBlue. All startup point-
to-point entrants have created hub-and-spoke networks: Airtran
in Atlanta, Frontier in Denver, and Spirit in Fort Lauderdale. 20 6
This is an important point that must be emphasized: the so-
called 'point-to-point' low-cost airlines created and operate hub-
and-spokes network systems.
Four main aspects differentiate the hub-and-spoke models es-
tablished by the new entrants from the incumbents' traditional
models. The differences, however, may diminish as the size and
complexity of the startup operations grow and their entry mod-
els evolve. First, there is the obvious aspect of size: incumbent
hubs are large, while new entrants start small. 2 7 These hubs are
simpler and less expensive to operate, yet their size and com-
2 (2 JetBlue Airways Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Feb. 18, 2003).
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Press ReleaseJetBlue Airways Corp.,JetBlue Begins Service with EMBRAER
190 Aircraft (Nov. 8, 2005), http://investor'jetblue.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=
131045&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=780174&highlight.
206 See generally AirTran Airways, http://www.airtran.com; Frontier Airlines,
http://www.frontierairlines.com; Spirit Airlines, http://www.spiritair.com (last
visited Oct. 9, 2007).
207 Gillen, supra note 118, at 372-73.
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plexities are expected to grow over time if an entry is
successful.2 °8
Second, scheduling plays an important role in making point-
to-point service compatible for connection. 2°' The traditional
incumbents' strategy involves flying concerted waves during
peak demand times. The new entrants operate a smaller num-
ber of more evenly spread out flights during the day.210 This
strategy reduces congestion-related costs but requires longer
waiting time for connecting flights. 211 This pattern may change
as the number of spokes served grows, flight frequency in-
creases, and the number of passengers carried grows.
Third, the new entrants adopted a one-aircraft-type entry
strategy, enjoying operational economies of commonality and
standardization, but specializing in a certain product and mar-
ket.212 Incumbents, on the other hand, service many markets
with several aircraft types and sizes.213 As mentioned before, Jet-
Blue has changed its one aircraft fleet penetration strategy by
ordering new Embraer aircraft, 214 Airtran upgraded its old DC9
aircraft to B717 215 and later added 737NG aircraft, and South-
west entered a code share using larger aircraft.216 These and
other low-cost airlines indicated that they are considering ex-
panding their reach by code share agreements with other air-
lines.2 17 The complexity and diversity of the new low-cost airline
fleets, operations, and products are expected to grow if their
growth is sustained. 218
Finally, there is an important issue regarding fare strategy. In
general, low-cost entrants tend toward dynamic, inter-temporal
price discrimination based on expected demand for a specific
unbundled (one-way) flight.219 But the new entrants are cur-
208 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 139.
209 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 41-42; Gillen, supra note 118, at 371, 374.
210 Gillen, supra note 118, at 371, 374.
211 See id.
212 WACHOVIA SECURITIES, NORTH AMERICAN FLEET HANDBOOK 7-14, 16 (2005).
213 Id.
214 JET INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 41.
215 Press Release, Boeing Co., Boeing Statement on AirTran 737 Announce-
ment (May 23, 2007), http://wwwv.boeing.com/news/releases/2007/070523b_
nr.html.
216 ATA Codeshare, supra note 175.
217 Low-Cost Carriers Start to Change Their Roadmaps, AVIATION DAILY, June 5,
2006, at 4.
218 Id.
219 See David Gillen & Tim Hazledine, The New Price Descrimination and Pricing in
Airline Markets: Implications for Competition and Antitrust 3 (X1V Pan-American Con-
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rently facing increasing costs as well as other growing pains. 221
The honeymoon period of minimal costs for maintaining new
aircraft fleets is about to end, and expensive engine and air-
frame maintenance, as well as higher fuel and interest expenses,
have been pushing costs up.2 2 ' The low-cost entrants may not
be able to sustain their low penetration fares much longer. Now
that they have established a critical market mass, they are pres-
sured to increase fares.22 2 Will they stick to their entry fare strat-
egy, or will they introduce traditional or other elements of fare
discrimination in order to increase revenues? Bundling tickets
on a round-trip basis locks-in passengers that otherwise may use
a competing airline for a return flight. Also, restrictions related
to return flights have constituted a major element in the tradi-
tional market segmentation technique of high-willingness-to pay
passengers.223 Setting fares of connecting flights has an impor-
tant impact on overall network revenues and traffic flows. 2 24
Under certain circumstances, setting a lower fare on a connect-
ing segment-or rejecting a point-to-point passenger for a con-
necting one-may increase overall system revenues.225 How will
the new entrants develop their fare strategy as connection pos-
sibilities grow and their products become more complex? 226
Also, the new internet-based direct ticket distribution systems,
ference on Traffic & Transportation Engineering, Sept. 20-23, 2006), available at
http://www.transport.gov.nz/assets/NewPDFs/18-September-06-paper-from-
Profs-Gillen-and-Hazledine-re-pricing.pdf. There is generally no (or only lim-
ited) inter-personal or inter-group price discrimination on the basis of demand
elasticity. A business passenger and a tourist will pay the same fare on the same
seat. Fares, however, change in relation to the demand for a specific flight over
time.
220 See SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 139.
221 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 259.
222 Bruce Mohl, JetBlue, Southwest to Raise Air Fares, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23,
2006, at D1, available at http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2006/02/23/
jetblue southwest to raise air fares/.
223 The number of days stayed at a destination (as well as weekend return) was
a major product versioning and market segmentation device in the traditional
incumbents' yield management model. SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at
137-38.
224 Gillen, supra note 118, at 370.
225 See Smith, supra note 125, at 39-40.
226 In traditional yield management a seat is "damaged" in order to segment
passengers. Passengers are usually frustrated with what look to them as artificially
imposed restrictions on similar seats. Airlines have recently started experi-
menting with fare discrimination based on physical demand attributes, for exam-
ple, charging a premium on a seat with more legroom, or for window or aisle
seats. Northwest Airlines to Charge More for Legroom, M-TRAVEL.COM, Mar. 15, 2006,
http://wwv.m-travel.com/news/2006/03/northwestairli.html.
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created by the startups, enabled them to overcome the historic
barrier to entry imposed by the traditional global distribution
221systems. 7 Will these new systems be sufficient to sustain growth
in the long run, or will connection to the traditional systems be
necessary in order to do So?228
V. THE LONG-HAUL REVOLUTION
The first sixty years of aircraft technology were punctuated by
frequent radical innovations and changes. 229 During this ferment
era, technology explorations drove the industry, changing the
shape, functionality and uses of aircraft, creating new markets,
and redefining existing ones.2  In the late 1950s, the Boeing
707 revolutionized the industry and emerged as the dominant
design-concept of commercial jet aircraft, starting an impressive
gradual and evolutionary strand of successor aircraft models.23 1
Competition shifted from inter-standard to intra-standard orien-
tation.2 3 2 Over time, the aircraft building industry has consoli-
dated into a duopoly,2 3 while experiencing a consistent process
of increasing specialization and vertical disintegration as more
design and production tasks and risks have been outsourced to
lower level supply-chain members. 234 Boeing and Airbus have
assumed the role of the prime system integrators.115 Lower-level
integrators (engines, avionics, material) drove most of the inno-
vations and changes within the constraints of existing and grad-
227 Gillen, supra note 118, at 373.
228 Code-share and other interlining agreements with U.S. major or foreign
airlines require connecting with the global distribution systems. Using global dis-
tribution systems increases costs considerably in comparison to direct internet
systems. Gillen, supra note 118, at 373.
229 See Murman et al., supra note 1, at 481-82; Kroo, supra note 9, at 1.
230 See id.
231 Kroo, supra note 9, at 1.
232 The World Bank Info. Dev. &Int'l Telecomm. Union, ICT Regulation Tool-
kit: Intra-and Inter-Standard Competition, http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/
en/section.2459.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2007); Horng, supra note 25, at 90,
116.
233 JET INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at xi.
234 See, e.g., DAVID PRITCHARD & ALAN MACPHERSON, BOEING'S DIFFUSION OF
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY TO JAPAN: SUR-
RENDERING THE US AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY FOR FOREIGN FINANCIAL SUPPORT 2-3, (Ca-
nada-United States Trade Center Occasional Paper No. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.custac.buffalo.edu/docs/OccasionalPaper30.pdf.
235 See Horng, supra note 25, at 30-42.
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ually evolving interface standards.2 6 Subsystem innovations
have been integrated without causing major disruptions to the
overall aircraft system or to its operational environment such as
airports or air traffic control.23 7
The general non-exclusive and shared-nature of lower level
supply-chain relationships and the mandatory standards im-
posed by regulatory bodies facilitate industry-wide accumulation
and diffusion of standard and modular technology. 23 8 Prime in-
tegrators tap into a largely similar technology base offered by
supply-chain members. 239 Innovations achieved in aircraft-spe-
cific projects often trigger feedback into the supply-chain net-
work, and affect and drive further innovation and
competition. 2 0 This is particularly noticeable in (but by no
means limited to) engine design, which, to a large extent, has
driven aircraft evolution.241 For example, new technology devel-
oped by an engine manufacturer for a specific aircraft model
has been used in the same or similar version or in derivative
engines to power competing aircraft designed by the same or
other aircraft manufacturers.242 In a manner typical to other
mature industries, market segmentation and aircraft customiza-
tion have also increased significantly.2"43 The current availability
of intra- and inter- aircraft family variety is quite impressive in
comparison to the one-size-fits-all paradigm of the late 1950s
and 1960s.244
A. INNOVATION AND COMPETITION IN THE
LONG-HAUL AIRCRAFT
The main implication of the pattern roughly sketched above
is that it has become increasingly more costly to effect (even
236 See A.T. KEARNEY, RESTRUCTURING THE GLOBAL AEROSPACE INDUSTRY, THE
SHIFTING ROLES OF SUPPLIERS 1-6 (2003) [hereinafter RESTRUCTURING], available
at http://www.seaonline.org/docs/Restruct aerospa-B5929.pdf.
237 See Horng, supra note 25, at 30-42.
238 JET INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at xi; RESTRUCTURING, supra note 236 at 8;
Horng, supra note 25, at 23.
239 BEUTH VERLAG, ECOMONIC BENEFITS OF STANDARDIZATION 21-22 (2001),
available at http://www.dinide/sexcms-upload/media/2896/Economic%20
benefits%20of%20standardization.pdf.
240 See Horng, supra note 25, at 30-42.
241 See Horng, supra note 25, at 54, 84.
242 Kroo, supra note 9, at 1.
243 See manufacturers' websites. See, e.g., Honeywell Int'l Ind., http://www.
honeywell.com/aero/technology/tech-areas3/propulsion-apu-air-management.
html?c=41 (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
244 See, e.g., GEROSKI, supra note 5, at 72.
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only incrementally) product innovations and changes from one
aircraft generation to the next.245 Moreover, such innovations
may not be perceived as significant or may not even be noticea-
ble to passengers. In addition, it is difficult for Boeing and
Airbus to differentiate same-generation competing aircraft mod-
els from each other.24' Despite impressive innovations, most air-
craft performance measures have not changed much since the
1960s, except for significant reduction in fuel consumption and
noise. 241 In addition, although the numbers of origins and des-
tinations served by airlines have grown dramatically and average
real fares have declined, the speed and most other quality char-
acteristics of the average travel service have not changed much
compared to regulation-era levels.248
These general observations are typical for an industry in a ma-
ture stage of its life cycle and suggest that competition is ex-
pected to increasingly center on price.249 A state-of-the-art
Airbus A340, for example, looks quite similar to the standard-
setting Boeing B707 of the late 1950s.25 ° Its subassemblies and
components, however, are radically different. 251 The dramatic
accumulation of evolutionary incremental innovations and
changes occuring mostly at the subsystem and component levels
for almost five decades has not destroyed the dominant model
that emerged with the 707, but, rather, improved its effi-
ciency. 252 In addition, to most boarding passengers, an Airbus
A330 looks quite similar to a competing Boeing 777 and offers a
similar service.
This general evolutionary path sheds light on the dilemma
faced by Boeing and Airbus during the late 1990s and early
2000s: where could they go next with aircraft technology, inno-
vation, and competition? They explored opportunities for sus-
taining up-market innovations by pushing existing technology
boundaries to increase the size, speed, and efficiency of air-
craft.253 Both companies explored the possibility of building a
super jumbo for over a decade, separately and jointly.254 Boe-
245 See Horng, supra note 25, at 37.











ing-at the time enjoying a monopolistic position in building
the largest aircraft, the 747-400-was consistently more skeptical
of a super jumbo program, citing, among other things, high de-
sign and prototype production costs relative to the potential size
of the market.2 55 The pursuit of supersonic commercial flying,
once considered a natural direction for innovation, was largely
abandoned or at least delayed because of economic and envi-
ronmental considerations.2 5 6
In the late 1990s it seemed that Boeing had settled on increas-
ing aircraft speed and Airbus on increasing aircraft size. Boeing
introduced the concept of the sonic cruiser, a medium size air-
craft that would almost reach the speed of sound. 257 Airbus de-
cided to break the record of aircraft size and focused on
building an even larger jumbo than Boeing's. 258 In the early
2000s Boeing dropped its sonic cruiser concept.2 59 In 2004 it
launched the 787 program, a medium-size aircraft in the long-
haul market with largely standard operational characteristics
and with most innovations focusing on making it more cost-
efficient.260
For a moment the situation seemed to have sorted itself out.
Airbus would build the A380, a super jumbo aircraft in the 555-
seat category. 26 Boeing would build the 787, a super efficient
aircraft in the 250- to 300- seat category.2 62 Although there were
skeptics on both sides, it made sense for Boeing, which had ter-
minated its 757263 and 767 aircraft programs, and was about to
shut down the 747-400 lines,2 64 to launch the 787 family. This,
255 See id.
256 See, e.g., Asif Siddiqi, U.S. Centennial of Flight Comm'n, High-Speed Trans-
port in Commercial Aviation, http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/
CommercialAviation/High_Speed/Tranll.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
257 See Boeing Co., News Feature - Sonic Cruiser, http://www.boeing.com/
news/feature/concept/index.html [hereinafter Sonic Cruiser] (last visited Sept.
13, 2007).
258 SeeAirbus S.A.S., A380 First Flight, http://events.airbus.com/A380/seeing/
indexminisite.aspx (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
259 See Sonic Cruiser, supra note 257.
200 Boeing Co., Commercial Airplanes 787 Dreamliner Background, http://
www.boeing.com/commercial/787family/background.html (last visited Sept. 13,
2007).
261 Horng, supra note 25, at 81.
262 Id. at 87.
263 Boeing Co., Commercial Airplanes, 757 Program, http://wv.boeing.
com/commercial/757family/background.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
264 Boeing Co., The Boeing 767 Family - Leading the Way in a Dynamic Mar-
ket, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/767family/background.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 9, 2007); Boeing Co., The Boeing 747 Family - The Right Choice for
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and the larger 777 family (including the largest 777-300 that be-
came available in the early 2000) would substitute for the pro-
duction lines to be shut down and cover the long-haul markets.
A potential hole in the medium-haul market could be taken
care of by stretching the 737. The 787 could provide point-to-
point travel from many desirable destinations, including smaller
airports, without the need to connect to major hubs. 265 Because
of its size, the A380 would be suitable for operation in the high-
est density, long-haul hub markets. 266 The A380 could gain po-
tential market share from the shutting down of the Boeing 747-
400 program, complementing the relatively young Airbus A330
and A340 families.267
The above scenario seemed like a reasonable solution. Each
player would focus on a different niche, enabling large enough
market shares to amortize the huge costs of designing and build-
ing the prototypes of these aircraft, and each party would maxi-
mize expected income related to its niche. At the end of 2004,
however, Airbus announced the launch of the A350 in competi-
tion with the 787.268 In 2005, Boeing announced the launch of
the 747-800, a new derivative of the 400 model in the 400- to
500- seat category.269 The long-haul market has never been so
crowded, and competition is expected to be fierce.27 °
the Large Airplane Market, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/747family/
background.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
265 Horng, supra note 25, at 87.
266 Id.
267 See id.
268 Airbus S.A.S., Airbus Aircraft Families: A350 Family, http://wvw.airbus.
com/en/aircraftfamilies/a350/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
269 Boeing Co., Boeing 747-8 Family, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/
747family/747-8_background.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2007). This outcome
may not be surprising to economists since it resembles a standard static formula-
tion of a prisoner's dilemma. A stable Nash equilibrium is Pareto suboptimal.
See any introductory text on Game Theory.
270 The 777 family includes: 777-200, 777-200ER, 777-200LR, 777-300, and 777-
300ER. Boeing Co., Commercial Airplanes - About the 777 Family, http://wv.
boeing.com/commercial/777family/background.html (last visited Sept. 24,
2007). The 787 family was launched with three variants: 787-3, 787-8, and 787-9.
Boeing Co., Commercial Airplanes-787 Dreamliner Background, http://www.
boeing.com/commercial/787family/background.html (last visited Sept. 24,
2007). Subsequently a fourth longer-range member, the 787-10, was introduced.
Press Release, Boeing Co., Boeing Working on Future 787 Models Including a
787-10 (June 19, 2007), http://ww-w.boeing.com/news/releases/2007/
qz1070619clDr.html. Airbus had introduced the A350 family (as a moderate
innovation increment in comparison to its A330 family) and later introduced a
more ambitious plan for the A350-XWB (extra wide body) with four variants:
A350-800, A350-900, A350-900R, and A350-1000. Airbus S.A.S., Airbus Aircraft
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B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AIRLINE MARKET
What are the possible implications of the above for the airline
market? First, the competition between Boeing and Airbus is
expected to drive new aircraft prices and respective airline fares
down (everything else remaining equal) .271 Aggressive market-
ing and manufacturers' rivalry-to which the industry has be-
come accustomed for over a decade-includes, but is not
limited to government subsidized financing, equity participa-
tion, mezzanine financing, risk sharing, old aircraft trade-in,
warranties, promotional advertising, training, technical and
other after-sale support, as well as many other sale promotion
techniques used by the manufacturers. 27 2 One cannot overesti-
mate the importance of this issue and its impact on aircraft
price and industry dynamics and structure.273 Competition in
the airline industry is driven, to a large extent, by the evolution
of the aircraft industry.27 4 The general move from Boeing as a
single dominant supplier to a new structure of an aggressively
competing duopoly has driven aircraft prices down.2 75 This
trend has already affected the medium-haul market and is ex-
pected to affect the long-haul as well. 27h
Second, it is expected that startup airline entry attempts will
emerge in the long-haul markets. 277 Such entry may imitate or
apply the experience of the medium-haul market using the new
aircraft in a low-cost point-to-point strategy. 278 In fact, various
Families-A350 XWB Technology and Innovation, http://www.airbus.com/en/
aircraftfamilies/a350/technology.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2007). In addition it
offers the A330 family including the A330-200 and A330-300, as well as the A340
family, including the A340-300, A340-400, A340-500, and A340-600. Airbus S.A.S.,
Airbus Aircraft Families, http://www.airbus.com/en/aircraftfamilies (last visited
Sept. 24, 2007). The above models and variant availability is unprecedented in
aviation industry.
271 JET INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 50-52.
272 JET INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 20, 155, 157, 164-72.
273 Airbus, for example, agreed to assist US Airways to emerge from bank-
ruptcy by lending $250 million, in return for an order for A350 aircraft. US Air-
ways agreed to be the launching customer of the aircraft in the United States.
For financial arrangements between US Airways and Airbus, see, e.g., U.S. Airways
Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 16 (Mar. 15, 2006).
274 Kroo, supra note 9, at 1.
275 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 101.
276 See Boeing Co., 747-8 Family, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/
747famil1747-8_background.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2007).
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startup ventures around the world announced their intent to do
so and several have placed orders for new aircraft.2 "' The al-
most frantic attempts of the manufacturers to book sales in or-
der to justify launching their respective programs fuel such
attempts.28 0 The launching of the new aircraft is expected to
push prices of previous generation aircraft down, and possibly
encourage new entry into the long-haul with these aircraft as
well (i.e., the 767 and 747).281
Third, medium-haul, low-cost airlines could expand their op-
erations with new aircraft, mostly the B787 or A350. JetBlue
could, arguably, be tempted to expand to destinations across the
Atlantic or in Latin America using the A350, for example. The
European low-cost airlines Easyjet or Ryanair could do the same
from the other side of the Atlantic. 28 2 Low-cost airlines on both
sides of the Atlantic could connect with the new long-haul air-
craft through subsourcing (code share) or direct ownership and
operations. 83
Fourth, for the major incumbents, this is a major battle for
survival; for some of them, perhaps, the last battle. They have
outsourced an increasing portion of their short-haul operations
and have become increasingly dependent on their regional affil-
iates in the first revolution.284 They have lost a significant part
of their traditional domestic market to new medium-haul, low-
cost entry in the second revolution.28 5 Their experience in the
second revolution has demonstrated that potential new startup
entry to the long-haul market must be taken seriously even if
one assumes that the chance of such an entry to succeed is
small.2 ' They must re-establish their grip over the long-haul
market in a new way in order to survive. They face strong com-
petition from other airlines, national and foreign, in their major
271 See, e.g., Parmy Olson, Low-Cost, Long-Haul-A Long Shot?, FORBES.COM,
Oct. 27, 2006, http://Nvw.forbes.com/markets/2006/10/27/oasis-hong-kong-
markets-equity-cx-po_1027markets04.html; Andrew Compart, Plenty of Buzz in the
Air as LCAs Spread Their Wings, TRA-%L WEEKLY, Oct. 3, 2006, http://ww.
terrapinn.com/2007/wlca/Custom_12580.stm.
280 See BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 250.
281 Id.; Olson, supra note 279; Compart, supra note 279.
282 Olson, supra note 279; Compart, supra note 279.
283 Lori Ranson, Low-Cost Carriers Forge New Boundaries, AVIATION WEEK, Aug. 20,
2006, http://Nw.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story-generic.jsp?channel-awst
&id=news/aw082106p3.xml.
284 FAA FORECASTS 2003-2014, supra note 61, at IV-7.
285 FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at 5.
286 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 16, 241-44.
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incumbent group, and potential competition from new startup
entrants targeting the long-haul market.2 17 They face a trend of
increasing liberalization toward open skies, which encourages
more competition and new entry by U.S. and foreign airlines.288
An open sky agreement with Europe, once concluded, will open
the Atlantic to unprecedented competition. 89
The major incumbents are facing this revolution in a weak-
ened state, burdened by enormous debt, continuous reorganiza-
tion efforts (in and out of bankruptcy courts), high fuel prices,
and labor disputes.29" Aggressive restructuring and workouts
must address this new condition. Will they be in a position to
upgrade fleets to the new aircraft?29' This may require retiring
aircraft that still have long lives remaining and high balance
sheet values. In the new competitive environment, a startup en-
try that is clear of historic commitments to labor, aircraft own-
ers, and debtors and can acquire new aircraft under extremely
favorable terms, is a power to reckon with, even if only for a
short time.292
For passengers, this new war on the long-haul is expected to
translate into lower fares; for airlines it means lower margins
and increasing pressures for reducing costs. 293
VI. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
During the regulation regime the government imposed a
three-category structure on the industry, consisting of: 1) local
(commuter); 2) regional (intrastate); and 3) major (trunk) air-
lines.294 Airlines in each category specialized in operating differ-
ent aircraft classes and related markets. 295 Interlining across
categories was possible subject to a regulated fare agreement.296
Regulation kept the structure of the airline industry rigid and
287 Sparaco, supra note 277, at 72.
288 US, EU Ink 'Open Skies' Pact, EUBUSINESS (May 1, 2007), http://www.eu
business.com/transport/openskies.32/ [hereinafter Open Skies].
289 See id.
290 FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at 5.
291 The major U.S. airlines are financially weaker in comparison to many of
their foreign competitors. These foreign airlines are in a better position to ac-
quire the new aircraft.
292 See BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 248-49.
293 See Sparaco, supra note 277, at 72.
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eliminated shakeouts. 297 Only major airlines acquired new air-
craft technology. 298 They began acquiring the revolutionary
new jet aircraft in the late 1950s, enhancing their competence
with no significant changes in the structure of the regulated car-
tel.299 Fixed, regulated fares encouraged largely homogenous,
high-quality service and eliminated the possibility of fare-based
differentiation and low-fare competition or entry."'
Deregulation spurred a rigorous trend by major airlines to ex-
pand and consolidate networks using complex integrated hub-
and-spoke architecture .30 1 The regulated three-category struc-
ture was destroyed by competition.30 2 Pre-deregulation, non-
trunk airlines consolidated and integrated into the major air-
lines' networks. 3  The consolidation of the major airlines (in-
cluding the demise of Pan Am, Eastern, Braniff, and later TWA)
created a group of only a few winning major airlines dominated
by American, United, and Delta." 4 International alliances fur-
ther integrated and expanded networks on a global basis.3 5
Each major network operated the medium- and most of the
long-haul flights and code-shared most other flights, providing
seamless interlining over regional, national, and international
markets across continents. 06 Each major network operated like
a large travel department store, offering a diverse set of prod-
ucts and services for all passengers. 30 7
In the regional revolution, the interaction of incremental air-
craft innovations and the unfolding hub-and-spoke strategy ena-
bled the creation of a new market niche. Bombardier and
Embraer emerged as the dominant manufacturers in this new
niche, and their sustained up-market drive further threatens to
disrupt Boeing and Airbus in the smaller aircraft section of the
jet building market."0 Growing regional airlines have gradually
297 Vietor, supra note 18, at 21-24.
298 Id. at 25-28.
299 Id.
300 For the industry's structure during regulation, see, e.g., Vietor, supra note 18,
at 19-58.
301 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 53.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 7.
305 FAA FORECASTS 2003-2014, supra note 61, at IV-2, V-5, IV-8.
306 Bilateral regulation precludes mergers and acquisition of control over for-
eign airlines. Complex and varied code share and other marketing arrangements
enable cross-national network integration.
307 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 255.
308 JET INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 35.
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migrated into and captured an increasing part of the traditional
mainline market, specializing in operating one aircraft category
(50- to 100-seat) and respective markets."" A few of the region-
als grew larger than others, taking advantage of economies of
scale and risk-sharing to create a new trend of regional specialist
serving more than one major incumbent.1 0
In the medium-haul market section, Southwest and a group of
startup airlines have destroyed the dominant incumbent busi-
ness model of the 1990s, capturing an increasing share of the
domestic market and assuming price leadership in this niche." I
This airline group specializes in one aircraft-category (100- to
160- seat) and respective markets.3 1 2 Applying new process-tech-
nology, the startup entry of the early 2000s accelerated an indus-
try-wide trend of innovation, restructuring, and pushing toward
leaner production processes and further real fare reductions. 31 3
The two airline revolutions and the approaching third re-
present a shift toward increasing vertical specialization and dis-
integration of production, as well as product differentiation
based on market segmentation. 4 We have already seen the
emerging new regional and national specializing airlines that
have captured an increasing part of the traditional incumbent
markets. 15 It is not clear yet how the long-haul market will
evolve and whether the major incumbents will lose their domi-
nance in this market to U.S. or foreign incumbents and startups.
A battle over dominance of this market has already started and
is expected to accelerate with the delivery of the new generation
aircraft, and as further deregulation and liberalization becomes
effective. 6 We already see startups getting organized in an at-
tempt to apply low-cost/low-fare entry strategies to the long-haul
30. FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at 5.
310 MOZDZANOWSKA, supra note 56, at 5. This trend appears in many industries;
most noticeable is lower-level supply-chain members in computer and consumer
electronics that specialize and provide similar components to several primary
integrators.
31 FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at 5.
312 WACHOVIA SECURITIES, supra note 212, at 16.
313 Horng, supra note 25, at 92.
314 See 787 Dreamliner, supra note 260.
315 The share of regional and low-cost airlines in domestic traffic in 2000 was
30% and increased to 45% in 2005. FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at 5.
313 Relaxing international (bilateral) regulations is expected to increase entry
and expand point-to-point service into U.S. destinations, including secondary
markets that currently require hub connections. Open Skies, supra note 288.
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market, as well as segmentation and differentiation attempts
targeting the high paying business section of this market.3 17
This general trend of vertical disintegration, market segmen-
tation, and increased specialization by new entry is expected to
reduce the incumbents' overall market share3 1 " and is likely to
push further for consolidation of the incumbent major airlines
through mergers, code-share arrangements, and liquidation." 9
A possible outcome of this trend is that a smaller and leaner
group of winning major incumbents will provide the standard
core service (including complex, seamless interlining with re-
gional and international alliance partners), and a group of
smaller (specializing) airlines will focus on serving niche mar-
kets. It will be interesting to see if any one of the specializing
airlines will migrate significantly to displace or dominate the ser-
vice in the traditional incumbents' markets or otherwise provide
an alternative low-cost global network service.
While the change in each airline market section taken sepa-
rately appears to be revolutionary, taken together as an industry
system they amount to incremental overall change that fits into
the general pattern of evolution observed in other industries.320
During maturity stages, consolidation tends to increase, produc-
tion costs and prices tend to decrease, production processes
tend to disintegrate vertically through increasing specialization
and outsourcing, and market segmentation tends to drive prod-
uct differentiation and increased product customization.3 21 It is
expected in this industry stage that new niche entries will at-
tempt price/quality-differentiation, targeting under-served or
over-served market segments. 22
The main difference is that the airline industry has exhibited
these typical trends relatively late in its history because of the
317 A new transatlantic business/first only service emerged in the early 2000s,
starting with Lufthansa and joined by EOS and Maxjet to London and Eurofly to
Italy. Aude Lagorce, Virgin Atlantic to Launch All-Business 17ight, MARKETWATCH,
June 4, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/virgin-atlantic-plans-
business-class-only-flights/story.aspx?guid=%7B262AF2BA-2E40-4465-B201-C8017
D3A088D%7D.
318 FAA FORECAST 2005, supra note 66, at 5.
319 David Bond, No Sale: Delta's Creditors Stand by the Company, and US Airways
Goes Home Empty-Handed, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 5, 2007, at 38.
320 UTrERBACK, supra note 1, at 215; RESTRUCTURING, supra note 236, at 3.
321 UTFERBACK, supra note 1, at xviii.
322 Id.; Harrell, supra note 119.
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constraints of regulation. 2 3 It was only in the 1980s, two de-
cades afterjet technology became a dominant standard, that air-
lines were permitted to compete. 24 At the same time, the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a New World
Order shifted the traditional trajectory of the arms race in dif-
ferent directions and with it the significant technology spillovers
enjoyed by the industry for several decades. 5 Moreover, oil
prices and environmental concerns assumed major priorities in
aircraft design and operations.3 26 Together, all of these changes
put immense pressures on aircraft builders and operators to in-
novate and change their products and processes, searching for
new ways to adjust their dominant business models to a signifi-
cantly changing landscape.327
VIII. WHAT NEXT?
According to life cycle studies, incumbents tend to become
vulnerable to disruptive entry during an industry's mature
stage.121 Can we identify signs for potential disruptions in the
aircraft and airline markets? Will any of the specialist entrants
emerge to overshadow the respective leading incumbents?
Predicting emerging disruption is a tricky exercise and re-
quires consideration of complex interactions of many processes
including new technologies, several industries, and changing
regulations. Judging by historical experience, most disruptive
entries become obvious only with hindsight. 29 A few intriguing
questions, however, are worth posing. Will Embraer or Bombar-
dier be able to sustain their up market trajectory and affect the
aircraft production business as did Toyota, which, starting with
an inferior product, revolutionized the car industry by pioneer-
323 This is in comparison to the car industry, which experienced these trends
earlier.
324 Vietor, supra note 18, at 24, 27-30, 37-38.
325 Murman, supra note 1, at 481-82;JET INDUSTRV, supra note 47, at 27; See also
Gen. Elec. Co. Aviation, The CF34 Engine Family, http://www.geae.com/
engines/commercial/cf34/ (last visited Sept.. 14, 2007) (discussing the military
origins of the now commercial CF34 engine).
326 See Frenken, supra note 1, at 6; Murman, supra note 1, at 48-82; Sonic
Cruiser, 'supra note 257.
327 UTTERBACK, supra note 1, at xviii; RESTRUCTURING, supra note 236, at 6, 8, 9.
328 Geroski refers to this tendency as "the 'crisis of mature industries,' which
seems to afflict most well-established markets sooner or later." GEROSKI, supra
note 5, at 203.
9'21 See generally, INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA, supra note 4.
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ing the lean production concept?330 Will new entrants into the
jet-building niche, particularly China and Russia, be able to
commercialize their regional aircraft projects and become dis-
ruptive to the incumbent aircraft builders?331
The medium-haul revolution destroyed a long history of ex-
clusive access enjoyed by major incumbent airlines with respect
to new aircraft technology.3 32 In particular, sustaining incre-
mental innovation in dominant aircraft technology that tradi-
tionally had enhanced the competence of dominant incumbent
airlines has been acquired by startup entry and used against the
incumbents. 33 A similar trend is possible with the launching of
the new long-haul aircraft. It remains to be seen if the major
incumbents will remain the dominant operators of the new gen-
eration of long-haul aircraft.
Will low-cost airlines grow to disrupt the incumbent tradi-
tional market position as core providers of a general, global air
transportation service? Will Southwest change its traditional
strategy and expand its direct attacks on the incumbents' mar-
kets? The move by Southwest to code-share with ATA and a re-
cent announcement that it is considering other code-share
possibilities (including with a major incumbent) raises some in-
triguing possibilities.3 34 Southwest has exploited most of the
market potential of its traditional strategy.3 35 It could continue
restructuring its operations and expand its network through
outsourcing (code-share) agreements with regional and longer-
range operators including international airlines, and it could
emerge as a new version of a differently-integrated lean and ef-
fective alternative global network.336 Similarly, as mentioned
before, low-cost startups may expand their network through up-
stream and downstream integration, through self-operation, or
330 SeeJAMES P. WOMACK, DANIEL T. JONES & DANIEL Roos, THE MACHINE THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD 79 (1991).
331 Both the Russian and Chinese governments introduced new regional jet
families (RRJ and ARJ21, respectively), as well as larger aircraft programs charac-
terized by complex multinational joint-venture arrangements with major Western
incumbents.
-32 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 249-50.
333 Id.
334 Terry Maxon, Southwest Airlines Plotting New Strategic Course, DALLAS MORN-
INC NEWS, Aug. 7, 2007, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/
dws/bus/stories/080207dnbussouthwest.d3f1979c.html; ATA Codeshare, supra
note 175.
335 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 132-33.
336 Maxon, supra note 334.
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through outsourcing to other airlines.3 7 Code-share arrange-
ments enable network expansion of niche-specializing airlines
without the need to sink enormous costs in building such
networks.33
What about possible innovations in aircraft technology? Will
a possible new radical innovation in an aircraft core subsystem
(a revolutionary power plant technology or new energy source)
be compatible (modular) or destructive to the current domi-
nant aircraft design and to the dominant incumbent aircraft
builders? How will it affect the airline industry? How will com-
puter aided tools further impact aircraft technology? These
tools have revolutionized aircraft design processes in two major
ways: 1) reducing design, testing, and building costs; and 2) im-
proving the product design.339 Most of the current applications
have focused on incremental improvement and increased effi-
ciency of standard product-technology (improving wing effi-
ciency is a good example)."4 But the new technology opens the
door for (virtual) testing and building of many new and alterna-
tive configuration concepts that were prohibitively costly
before. 4 ' This technology could relax somewhat the historical
lock-in constraints of path dependency and open new directions
for innovation. Will this new process-technology yield signifi-
cant product innovation?34 2
Evolutionary theories suggest that it is often outside industry
players that pioneer disruptive technology. 34 3 This was the case
with Embraer and Bombardier.3 44 For almost four decades su-
personic flight was believed by many to be the next aircraft
revolution in the making; yet, it appears that Boeing and Airbus
have put their plans on hold while other players keep up efforts
in this direction. 4 5 Business jet designers are focusing on devel-
337 Lori Ranson, Low-Cost Carriers Start to Change Their Roadmaps, AVIATION
DAILY, June 5, 2006, at 4.
338 JET INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 102.
3S9 See Boeing Co., Computing & Design: Build Processes Help Develp the 777,
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/777family/pf/pf-computing.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 14, 2007).
340 Murman, supra note 1, at 481.
34, The availability of standard dominant design tools (CATIA) and the shared
access to this technology by inside and outside members of the aircraft building
duopoly contribute much to driving design innovations.
342 The Blended Wing design is a good example.
343 SEEING WHAT'S NEXT, supra note 4, at 270-71
344 Id. at 132-33.
345 See Sonic Cruiser, supra, note 257.
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oping supersonic business jets.'46 Will such a technology be
commercialized? Who will operate such aircraft? How will this
affect the airlines? Will the deal signed by the governments of
Japan and France in 2005 to develop supersonic commercial air-
craft materialize into a large supersonic aircraft?347 Who will
build this aircraft, and who will operate it? Will the new concept
of very light jet aircraft (VLJ), which has been introduced into
the market recently, create a significant and reliable on-demand
regional air-taxi service that could noticeably affect traditional
commercial airlines?34
Aircraft and airline markets coevolve and interact with the air-
craft operational environment (including airports and air traffic
control systems) and a complex set of economic, safety, and en-
vironmental regulations (domestic and international).349 Gov-
ernment control and intervention in these areas directly affect
innovation and industry structure. 5 ° While in some respects
governments have encouraged and facilitated innovation and
changes, in many others they have not. The rate of innovation
and changes in the air traffic control and airport system that are
under various levels of governmental controls is particularly dis-
appointing. Privatization or a shift to incentive-based operation
and regulation of these systems can have a significant impact on
innovation and competition. 5 ' Continuing the trend of der-
egulation and liberalization of international (bilateral) agree-
ments could significantly affect the airline industry. 2  The
current system is still based to a large extent on the post-WWII
346 Malcolm V. Lowe, World's First Supersonic Business Jet, POPULAR MECHS., Nov.
2004, http://www.popular mechanics.com/science/air-space/1303021.html.
347 Japan, France to Jointly Develop New Supersonic Jet, USA TODAY, June 15, 2005,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2005-06-15-supersonic-jet-x.
htm.
348 A few companies in Europe and the United States already placed a large
number of orders for such aircraft for commercial use. According to Acting
Transportation Secretary Maria Cino: "Thousands of new jets like this are going
to redefine the way Americans travel, help cut airport congestion and drive eco-
nomic growth in cities and towns across the country that today only dream of
commercial air service." Press Release, U. S. Dep't of Transp., U.S. Department
of Transporation Approves Provisional Type Certificate for Eclipse 500 (July 27,
2006), http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot8106.htm.
349 Gillen, supra note 118, at 28, 29.
3 0 Vietor, supra note 18, at 19-58.
351 Id.
352 Open Skies, supra note 288.
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national/political structure.3 5  A move to a market-driven,
global, network system could significantly affect the airline in-
dustry as well.
Finally, the story of the airline industry has important policy
implications that are beyond the scope of this article. It demon-
strates that, after all, one should not underestimate the creativity
of the free market forces. In the late 1990s, it appeared to many
observers that market creativity failed to challenge the major in-
cumbents' market power.Y14 Unprecedented antitrust and regu-
lation efforts were launched for the first time since
deregulation.
Looking back, these efforts may seem redundant and irrele-
vant. This is, however, reflective of the basic antitrust and regu-
lation challenges: it is only with hindsight that we can tell the
future.56 Moreover, because of the complexity of the issues in-
volved, one can find quite persuasive arguments for and against
government regulation and antitrust, even with hindsight.157
Market creativity entails destruction of previously dominant
products, processes, and organizations. Measuring the net ben-
efits of such creativity is extremely difficult, if at all possible, and
subject to judgment and debates. The low-cost revolution has
reduced real fares significantly, to the benefit of passengers.5 8
It accelerated, however, labor layoffs and enormous write-offs of
pension and other labor benefits, outstanding loan balances,
and aircraft and airline equity values.3 59
In the market battle for survival, there are winners, losers, and
a mixed bag of costs and benefits with ambiguous dynamics and
overall net social impact. This leaves the traditional policy de-
bate regarding regulation and antitrust of the airline industry
still young and lively, in spite of the industry's mature age.
33 Wikipedia, Open Skies, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Openskies (last ac-
cessed Sept. 19, 2007 at 8:10 CST).
'54 BEN-YOSEF, supra note 13, at 16.
355 Id.
356 Id. at 2-3, 16-17.
357 Id.
'158 Memorandum from Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector Gen., Office of the Sec'y
of Transp. to the Sec'y of Transp. 2 (June 30, 2005).
359 LCAs Are Growing and Profitable, supra note 12, at 3, 5.
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